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Civil Affairs Ops East and the reviewer would like to express their deepest gratitude towards everybody that supported the review process, primarily CLAs and their Focal Points, Civil Affairs officers across the Eastern provinces, MONUSCO Strategic Planning Cell, MONUSCO Best Practices, as well as staff from MONUSCO’s substantive sections and humanitarian partners.
Map of CLA deployment with gender ratio and functional telephone and radio CAN
Executive Summary

Two hundred and two Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) are deployed with MONUSCO peacekeepers in more than 70 military bases across Eastern DRC. CLAs establish communication and build reliable networks with local authorities, civil society and communities in the most remote parts of the country in order to:

- Collect information on security threats and alert MONUSCO peacekeepers and national defense and security forces to enable quick and effective response;
- Help local populations establish their own community alerts networks (CANs) and community protection plans (CPPs) to reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience to human rights violations;
- Provide operational support to visiting joint protection risk assessment or fact-finding missions (JAMs and JPTs), UN agencies and international or national NGO representatives at the local level;
- Assess the perceptions of local populations on the provision of security and justice services;
- Inform local populations about MONUSCO’s mandate and activities and encourage them to take ownership of and participate in those activities; and
- Develop or reinforce local capacities for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.

Indeed, CLAs are often MONUSCO’s only civilian presence in hard to reach locations, where they bridge the gaps between MONUSCO and local actors, helping peacekeepers who do not speak local languages to understand the needs of the local populations and to plan timely and effective responses to the threats they face. They also facilitate civil-military coordination at the local level, through their direct contact with the COB/TOB\(^1\) commanders, national security services, local authorities, and communities; serve as MONUSCO’s eyes and ears, providing the Mission’s civil and military components with first-hand information from the most remote areas, in daily reports that constitute extremely valued inputs in MONUSCO and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) strategic planning processes; and organize activities at the grassroots level in support of MONUSCO’s field missions or of its national and international partners.

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

CLAs are widely appreciated by the local populations and are regarded by MONUSCO’s civil and military components as indispensable for the successful implementation of the Mission’s protection of civilians (POC) mandate. However, a thorough assessment of the CLAs performance over the last few years reveals a number of weaknesses that can be addressed through the following measures:

- Ensure effective information exchange and response coordination/management between the Civil Affairs section, the Mission’s military and police components, the national security services, and other substantive components (JHRO, Child Protection, etc.).
- Provide regular feedback to CLAs on how the Mission processes and follows up on alerts they have issued, and encourage them to provide similar feedback to their contingent commander and their local partners (administrative authorities, security services, civil society, and the larger community).
- Brief peacekeeping contingents (especially TOB/COB commanders/troops) on the role, capacities and support requirements of CLAs, stressing the importance of collaboration between them in planning and implementing protection interventions and organize team-building exercises between CLAs and military commanders/troops.

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1 MONUSCO’s Force deployment is achieved through two types of military bases: i) Contingent Operating Base (COB, with +/− 100 troops); and ii) Temporary Operating Base, Mobile Operating Base, or Standing Combat Detachment (TOB/MOB/SCD, with +/−30 troops).
Increase significantly the number of female CLAs through targeted recruitment, in order to meet the Mission’s obligation to ensure gender mainstreaming in all its activities, and also to increase its access/reach to women in the national and local communities.

Way forward

As a highly flexible/adaptable and cost-effective resource, CLAs are in the best possible position to contribute to facilitating the transition from early recovery to stabilization. Once MONUSCO’s military successfully concludes the ‘Shape’ and ‘Clear’ phases of its strategy, CLAs will prove a great asset to help paving the way for the ‘Hold’ (early recovery) and ‘Build’ (stabilization) phases.

Subject to a revision of their Terms of Reference (TOR) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), CLAs could serve in the advanced MONUSCO teams to be deployed in the areas freed from armed groups and subsequently declared ‘Islands of Stability’. They will help to assess local needs and support coordinated interventions to restore state presence, coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and basic public/social services, and facilitate inter-community dialogue, confidence building and conflict mediation/resolution activities. Initially deployed in the remaining military bases, they could progressively be separated from the Force and collocated with local territorial administration offices, with support from UNPOL, other MONUSCO substantive sections and the UNCT.
Laurent Malindo was born 1977 in Kalima. After primary school he began his secondary studies, but opted to join the renowned military college L’EFO (Ecole de Formation des Officiers) before finishing his high school education. At L’EFO, he obtained a diploma in social and military sciences after three years of study, and then participated in combat operations in South Kivu and Maniema on the side of the AFDL.\(^3\) (1996-7).

However, in 1997, he decided to leave the army and continue his studies. After finishing his high school diploma, Laurent studied journalism from 2000 to 2002, obtaining a Bachelor of Arts (gradué). After several brief stints as a reporter, Laurent joined MONUC as an interpreter in 2003. He served with Indbatt and Milobs in Goma, Masisi and Kanyabayonga.

Laurent was one of the first CLAs to be recruited in 2010. After continuing in Kanyabayonga, he was deployed in Erengeti and Otobora (North Kivu). Because of his excellent performance, Laurent has been recently given the responsibility of coordinating Civil Affairs activities in the Walikale field office. As such, he is looking forward to closely working with the Congolese authorities and increasingly handing over responsibilities to them.

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\(^2\) Credits for the photo go to Myriam Asmani from MONUSCO’s PID.

\(^3\) The Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) was the rebel group, led by the father of the current president, which would eventually oust the Zaire’s long term dictator Joseph-Desire Mobuto.
1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) were developed in 2010 by the Civil Affairs section of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) as an interface between the Mission, the Congolese population and local authorities at the field level. MONUSCO’s 202 CLAs are Congolese national staff, primarily deployed with UN peacekeepers in more than 70 COB/TOBs across Eastern DRC. CLAs not only establish direct communication lines but also build relationships with the local authorities, communities and other relevant actors in the field. This allows them to perform a range of tasks, including information gathering, risks/needs assessments, managing MONUSCO’s early warning system activities, local-level coordination of and follow up on field visits, and strengthening the resilience of local communities to protection threats.

This review will provide the context and development of the CLA program, before comprehensively detailing their activities and impact, and finally providing recommendations to enhance future implementation.

1.2. Purpose of the review

Known as the ‘laboratory of protection’, MONUSCO, and its predecessor MONUC, has been at the forefront of developing innovative ways to translate its Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate into practice. One of the most successful innovations – the CLAs – is the subject of this review. The purpose of this document is threefold:

- As Civil Affairs coordinators have developed different approaches to managing CLAs across the country and are often occupied with operational matters, the review compares practices across offices and reflects on the lessons learned in order to improve current implementation in DRC.
- For MONUSCO’s Civil Affairs section, reviewing the opportunities and challenges of the CLAs is the basis for sharing the unique Congolese experience with DPKO and possibly replicating the instrument in other peacekeeping missions.
- The review of the CLA concept, its implementation and constant evolution is intended to fuel current discussions about MONUSCO’s on-going strategic reconfiguration and contributions that CLAs can make in this context.

This review provides an analysis of the CLAs’ impact and strengths as well as of current shortcomings and possible room for improvement. The main research question is whether the CLA instrument remains viable in MONUSCO’s changing context and in what ways it could be improved. The review also includes lessons learned and recommendations for adaptation and replication in other DPKO mission settings.

1.3. Methodology of the review

The review is based on a desk study of the existing material on CLAs (e.g. TORs, SOPs, work plans, performance reports, etc.), earlier reflections (CAN reviews, etc.) and CLA outputs (e.g. area profiles and reports). Additionally, substantive insights into CLA practices and CLA management were gained during extensive field visits and during six months’ work in Civil Affairs’ North Kivu office.

Data was collected in MONUSCO offices and COB/TOBs across the three eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu and Orientale. Additional data was collected through qualitative interviews with staff from MONUSCO’s

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4 Other peacekeeping missions have already solicited the expertise of MONUSCO’s Civil Affairs section. Accompanied by a CLA, former Civil Affairs chief Richard Snell has travelled to South Sudan to advise the Mission (UNMISS) on this tool. Similarly, acting CAS chief Laurent Guepin has advised the upcoming Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on the possibilities that CLAs offer.
different substantive sections, particularly CA managers and CLA focal points, UN agencies and humanitarian partners, the MONUSCO peacekeeping Force\(^5\), national security agents (i.e. FARDC, PNC and ANR)\(^6\), local customary and governmental authorities, and community leaders. In addition, focus group discussions were conducted with communities and CLAs.

\(^5\) This review will refer to MONUSCO’s military peacekeeping component as ‘the Force’ or the ‘peacekeeping Force’ or ‘peacekeepers’. To avoid confusion, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which has a more offensive mandate and was only recently established under UNSCR 2098 (2013), will be referred to under its full name.

\(^6\) These acronyms stand for: Force Armée de la République Démocratique du Congo, Police Nationale Congolaise and Agence National de Renseignement.
2. Background and Evolution of the CLA Concept

In eastern DRC, human security is continuously challenged by large scale violence and wide-spread abuses. While the main responsibility to protect civilians lies with the Congolese government (GoDRC), MONUSCO is mandated to take an active protection role to support the GoDRC in POC activities.\(^7\)

In November 2008, over 150 civilians were killed in Kiwanja – the majority summarily executed close to a MONUC base.\(^8\) This incident highlighted not only that MONUSCO’s Force had failed to collect and adequately analyze the information from the field but also to understand the reality of their operating environment. The missing link might have been the lack of a solid early warning network, the very cornerstone of the Community Alert Network (CAN). The incident furthermore underlined the need of a collective POC effort by national authorities, the Force, MONUSCO’s substantive sections, humanitarian partners and the communities themselves.\(^9\)

In 2009, and in response to those observations, MONUSCO established a joint assessment mechanism to improve civil-military coordination, planning and cooperation, the so called Joint Protection Teams (JPTs). JPTs succeeded in increasing MONUSCO’s understanding of local contexts and in ensuring multi-sectorial assessments, preventive plans and responses to imminent or on-going protection threats in remote areas. However, their short-time span (typically lasting 3-5 days) was found insufficient to achieve deeper and continuous analysis or to implement and follow up on JPT recommendations.\(^10\) It was concluded that a more permanent civilian presence on the ground and a closer engagement with local communities and authorities was needed.

At this time, the peacekeeping Force was seeking to recruit 49 interpreters and requested the assistance of the Civil Affairs Section. Noting the information gap identified above, Civil Affairs suggested that these interpreters could take on a more comprehensive role by engaging and liaising with the local population. The peacekeeping Force agreed and a new staff category was created: the Community Liaison Interpreters (CLIs).\(^11\)

In line with the ‘whole of mission approach’ to protecting civilians, CLAs were designed as a part of an overarching structure of complementary tools and procedures to extend MONUSCO’s outreach to the communities and enhance its protection capacity. The 49 initial CLIs were deployed to MONUSCO’s military bases to work directly with the mission’s military contingents. As such, they were not only intended to increase the functionality of UN peacekeepers by assisting contingents in identifying protection risks and tailoring location-specific protection responses, but also to complement other protection tools, particularly JPTs. In their original TORs\(^12\), CLAs were actually referred to as ‘JPT Liaison Officers’, defining the role they would take on through participating in JPT missions, following up on their recommendations and helping communities in developing Community Protection Plans (CPP)\(^13\). By managing the Community Alert Networks (CANs), CLAs would also take on a central role in MONUSCO’s early warning and early response (EWER) system.

The CLAs were an immediate success, making a variety of important contributions to the fulfillment of the Mission’s mandate. After his visit to the DRC in August-September 2010, Assistant Secretary General for

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7 As stated in UNSCR 2098 and UNSCR 2147, as well as in MONUSCO’s POC strategy.
8 MONUC preceded MONUSCO. The name of the Mission changed in 2010 with SCR 1925. To avoid confusion, this review will continuously apply the current name of the Mission (MONUSCO) even when referring to earlier time periods.
10 See JPT lessons learned study; 2013.
11 CLAs were originally named CLIs. In 2011, MONUSCO’s Senior Management changed the title of the Community Liaison Interpreters (CLIs) to Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) “in view of additional responsibilities assigned to them” and to better reflect the complex nature of their multi-dimensional activities (see Inter Office Memorandum, 1 April 2011). To avoid confusing the reader, this study will continuously apply the current terminology of ‘CLAs’.
12 CLI TORs 19.10.2009
13 These were originally called ‘Protection Action Plans’ and have changed in nature, as will be explained further below.
Peacekeeping, Atul Khare, recommended that MONUSCO should deploy at least two CLAs per military base.\textsuperscript{14} Covering the then 75 COB/TOBs in South Kivu, North Kivu and Orientale would have meant recruiting 101 additional CLAs to meet the 150 CLA target. However, due to instructions by the Mission’s senior management to recruit in several phases, Civil Affairs requested an additional 40 CLAs for the budget period of 2011-2012 to assign at least one CLA to each military base. By 2012, CLAs had gained enough recognition across MONUSCO’s different components and up to DPKO headquarters to enable Civil Affairs to recruit another 113 CLAs in a third phase.

After finalizing the third phase of recruitment, Civil Affairs had at its disposal a total of 202 CLAs, allowing each military base at least two, and particularly large and volatile areas with three CLAs. Despite this large increase of staff and the pending request for additional managerial capacity at the P-4 and P-5 levels, the Civil Affairs section never received additional capacity to manage such a large contingent in locations where logistics, security and telecommunication are extremely challenging. In response to these difficulties, Civil Affairs developed a system of CLA Focal Points. During the third recruitment phase, 14 CLAs were specifically hired for administering the field CLAs from the provincial offices.

Civil Affairs continuously develops the CLA instrument to better address the needs and priorities of the Mission. This progress is visible in changing TORs, expanding work plans and efforts to establish their SOPs.\textsuperscript{15} To prepare CLAs for changing demands, the Civil Affairs section has developed specific training modules, a tailored CLA Toolkit\textsuperscript{16}, and conducts regular debriefing sessions. Due to budgeting constraints, debriefing sessions will be held during only one day instead of two in future.

MONUSCO’s substantive sections quickly understood the CLAs’ value and have been increasingly requesting their support to prepare and facilitate activities in the field. In addition, Civil Affairs has adopted a more inclusive approach to making this resource a cross-section tool. For example, the lack of specific gender and HIV expertise and capacities at the field level was identified as a serious shortcoming by MONUSCO’s Gender Unit and HIV team. In order to bridge this gap, Civil Affairs transferred seven CLAs with specific gender and HIV capacities to work with and sensitize local communities.

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\textsuperscript{14} Within MONUSCO four types of military bases are deployed, named according to their size and character: Contingent Operating Base (COB), Temporary Operating Base (TOB), Mobile Operating Base (MOB), and Standing Combat Detachment (SCD). While COBs consist of about a 100 soldiers, the other three are limited to approximately 30 soldiers.

\textsuperscript{15} “In the context of UN peace operations, an SOP is a standing instruction, often based on best practice, which provides DPKO staff with guidance on how to implement a specific task, process or activity, or to achieve a desired result. Compliance is expected.” (\url{http://unterm.un.org/dgaacs/unterm.nsf/8fe9424f46f7601c85256983007ca4d8/b84657f7bfaa21b85256a0000077f26?OpenDocument}) The current SOPs for the CLAs can be found in the annex.

\textsuperscript{16} Find the CLA Handbook and Toolkit under \url{http://ppdh.un.org/Policy%20Guidance%20Database/MONUSCO%20Community%20Liaison%20Assistants%20Handbook%20August%202013.pdf}
Mamy Bahemurwaki Aboki was born in Nyakunda, Ituri district (Orientale) on July 30, 1979. After secondary school she studied health and nursing at the Pan African Institute in Bunia, where she graduated in 2002. Three years later, she finished her post-graduate studies at the National University of Bunia with a Master’s in public health. From 2002 to 2012 she worked for a number of international humanitarian organizations in Orientale, including COOPI DRC and Oxfam GB. In 2012, she was recruited by MONUSCO as a CLA. Mamy is one of the few female CLAs deployed in one of MONUSCO’s field bases, more precisely in COB Faradje (managed by the Dungu office). In her own words, at first it was very difficult to live as the only woman amongst all male, but she was able to establish herself with the support of her CLA colleagues and the COB commander. She says that when she visits villages in the area, local women are very happy that in the middle of the military escort there is a woman who pays attention to their needs, listens to their concerns and talks with them.
3. Implementation

3.1 Recruitment

MONUSCO’s CLAs are Congolese nationals with a variety of backgrounds and generally more than five years of field experience in humanitarian, protection and/or community work. In addition to proficiency in French and English, most CLAs are fluent in Swahili and at least one other local language spoken in their respective deployment area. Excellent communication and interpersonal skills are a must. Although their position (GL5) only requires a high school diploma, the great majority of CLAs hold a university degree which reflects the analytical demands of this position.

Text Box: CLA Profile of Magellan Manirampaye

As a native of Rutshuru territory (North Kivu), Magellan Manirampaye has spent his life working on education in the region, both as a teacher and as a humanitarian worker. He feels that teaching is very close to what he now does as a CLA, and is convinced that his background is helpful for his current tasks. Magellan holds a Bachelor of Arts (‘Graduat’) from Institut Supérieur Pédagogique (ISP) de Bukavu and a Master’s degree (‘License’) from ISP Goma. He was an English teacher and deputy headmaster for more than ten years before he started working as a humanitarian in 2004. Over the next seven years, he became a trainer of trainers on protection, HIV/AIDS and other crosscutting issues for different organizations from the Norwegian Refugee Council, to the International Rescue Committee and War Child. In 2012, he was recruited as a CLA with the South African Battalion in Ngungu (Masisi territory, North Kivu) and was subsequently deployed to Sake (Masisi), where he served for seven months with the Indian contingent. In February 2014, he was redeployed to Nyamilima, Rutshuru territory (NK). Although his fluency of several Hutu dialects and his familiarity with the area facilitate his work in Rutshuru, he cautions against the deployment of CLAs into their own ethnic communities as he himself struggles to balance the expectations of his own ethnic group (Hutus) against the possible prejudice against him of the opposing Nyande tribe.

CLAs have been recruited across all MONUSCO offices in the east – Goma, Beni, Bukavu, Uvira, Kalemie, Bunia and Dungu, and in Equateur where the Force is also deployed. The Joint Recruitment Committees consisted of representatives from Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Child Protection, UNPOL, the Force and Human Resources. The selection process included written and oral tests, language examinations and specific assessments on the aptitude of candidates to work in the field.

Best Practice: The process of recruiting 40 national staff and 113 CLAs during 2013 has been an enormous challenge for the section. Experience shows that recruited personnel have been most suitable for their tasks when (i) the national Human Resource section actively involved the relevant Civil Affairs personnel from the local office in the selection process, and (ii) when tailor-made entry exams were drafted to assess the qualities of the applicants against the specific demands of the field offices. Further synergies should be explored in the future, such as enabling ad-hoc joint recruitment teams composed of Civil Affairs Administrative Officers and Human Resources from HQ to support Human Resources and field offices in the sectors.

In spite of great efforts to redress the gender imbalance, 90% (182 of 202) of current CLAs are men. Reflecting on the six female CLAs working in 2010, Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Atul Khare, suggested that this low number remained a stumbling block for the Mission’s access to women in the communities. Some activities,
such as the perception survey\(^{17}\), require an equal number of male and female staff. The presence of female CLAs in conflict-affected areas also represents an important step for the empowerment of women, often victimized in these communities. Two factors help in understanding this phenomenon: (i) the challenging living conditions failed to attract women; (ii) male applicants tended to be better qualified, as men generally have better opportunities for education and employment in eastern DRC. Accordingly, male applicants performed better during exams and interviews. A solution for this dilemma might be to open vacancies specifically for female CLAs and commit more resources to training them during their assignment.

Of 149 CLAs deployed in military bases only nine (6\%) are female. This gender imbalance is probably exacerbated by the locations of the bases. Only four women, or 2\% of all CLAs, are based outside of urban centers. This can be explained by the logistical and cultural barriers to their deployment in the field with the Force. Gender roles in Congolese society mean that female CLAs have difficulties combining cultural and private obligations with their official duties, as women are expected to be present in the household and take care of the children. Arduous field conditions, where military bases lack basic sanitary and other facilities for women, are similarly discouraging. Finally, in addition to Congolese cultural considerations, certain practices of MONUSCO contingents are worth mentioning. Certain contingents, such as the Indian Battalion (IndBatt), do not have female soldiers in their fighting units and are uncomfortable with the presence of women on their bases. Reportedly, the Pakistani Battalion (PakBatt) has categorically refused to accommodate female CLAs.

Short, mid and long-term solutions might be envisaged to bridge this ‘gender-gap’:

(i) In the short-term, Civil Affairs should aim to further develop the concept of ‘mobile teams’ of female CLAs based in HQ or urban areas but implementing regular ad hoc missions to the field; lessons learnt can be drawn from CA Uvira (South Kivu), as they introduced this system in their mission planning.

(ii) In the mid-term, CA needs to closely liaise with engineering on the national and provincial level to ensure that gender-friendly facilities are provided for female CLAs.

(iii) As a long-term objective, Civil Affairs should continuously sensitize and rise awareness on the indispensable contribution of female CLAs in the field amongst all staff and COB/TOB contingencies.

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**Text Box: CLA Profile of Djulfa Djuma**

Djulfa Djuma was born in Butembo in 1983. After primary school, she started secondary education at Vungu High School obtaining a State Diploma in mathematics and physics. In 2003, Djulfa took a one-year English course in Kampala and subsequently continued studying IT at Kampala International University. In 2008 she graduated with a BA and went back to Butembo where she taught English for a couple of months before she was recruited by MONUC. In 2009, Djulfa joined the MONUC Bunia DDRRR section as Camp Assistant in the Moroccan and Bangladesh camps. From 2011 to 2012, she served as DDRRR Assistant with MONUSCO Dungu (Haut-Uele). In 2012, she was among the first female CLAs to be recruited and deployed in a red zone (Faradje). Because of her performance, she was quickly given the responsibility of CAN Focal Point after serving for eleven months.

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\(^{17}\) This is a joint initiative with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the United Nations Development program to gather local perceptions on peace and security in Eastern DRC. The project will be described in more detail below.
3.2 Training

Prior to their initial deployment, all CLAs receive two to three days of basic induction training on MONUSCO’s different protection tools and the ‘Do No Harm’ principle, as well as Human Rights, International Humanitarian and Refugee Law. Efforts to extend the length of this initial training have so far been limited by budgetary constraints.

Civil Affairs prioritizes continuous on-the-job training and ad-hoc capacity building for all personnel. CLAs regularly receive feedback on their performance and outputs, specific training tools, and guidance in debriefing sessions that are normally organized every two months. For Civil Affairs, these sessions are an opportunity to share best practices, discuss the scope for improvement in their performance, check on their motivation and provide specific training according to current needs. During these debriefings, internal and external partners are often invited to give special trainings according to their specific expertise. MONUSCO’s Sexual Violence section has for example sensitized CLAs on how to report and follow up on incidents. Further cooperation should be sought with the SSU (Stabilization Support Unit) in designing training modules for CLAs as their TORs evolve from protection to stabilization. Additionally, CLAs have expressed the desire for regular and transparent debriefing schedules so that they can plan accordingly. Civil Affairs should aim at maximizing synergies with the Integrated Mission Training Center (IMTC) to better respond to the training needs of CLAs.

Civil Affairs dedicated staff and resources to develop three generations of training material. The CLA Toolkit (2011) and the CLA Handbook (2013) have been designed to provide practical guidance that CLAs can consult according to emerging needs. The Handbook covers the theoretical and practical information needed for the CLAs to conduct their work and goes from explaining MONUSCO’s mandate to restating the CLA’s roles and responsibilities. The CLA Toolkit more specifically explains to CLAs how to do their work and provides practical exercises and scenarios. However, individual offices have also developed training material, particularly for the debriefing sessions. This material should be collected systematically and shared across all offices. Additionally, eventual amendments to the CLA TORs should lead to an up-to-date version of the CLA Handbook to encompass the new roles CLAs are expected to assume within the Island of Stability framework. Resources to develop effective debriefing inputs and innovative training materials, such as presentations or team-building exercises, should ideally be bundled at the Ops East level.

In order to complement the Force’s POC efforts, Civil Affairs has worked towards involving communities in their own protection through assisting them to identify their own priorities and needs, building their capacities and resilience, and developing community-coping mechanisms, such as Community Protection Committees (CPC). Civil Affairs could support CLA skills development through: (i) designing new training modules on stabilization encompassing the CLA’s role as the representative of CA within the Islands of Stability model and (ii) develop joint capacity-building modules that could bring together the Force and the CLAs and boost synergies on how to work together, effective reporting mechanisms and mutual trust.

3.3 Deployment

Currently, 149 (74%) of MONUSCO’s 202 CLAs are deployed in 63 out of 83 MONUSCO military bases. On average, two CLAs are deployed per military base, with the number going up to four in larger or particularly volatile areas. The locations of the bases are chosen according to a number of factors, including: the MSC protection matrix, which divides areas into ‘Must’, ‘Should’ and ‘Could’ protect. This routinely updated classification is regularly shared in the Senior Management Groups on Protection (SMGP-Ps) and forms an important basis for the brigade to effectively deploy bases.

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19 The Protection Cluster has developed a matrix which divides areas into ‘Must’, ‘Should’ and ‘Could’ protect. This routinely updated classification is regularly shared in the Senior Management Groups on Protection (SMGP-Ps) and forms an important basis for the brigade to effectively deploy bases.
roads), resources (e.g. mines, markets) and terrain (mountains, rivers, etc.). Most of the bases are thus located in strategically important areas with high threat levels for civilians, which are at the same time relatively remote and hard to reach for peacekeepers.

CLAs are frequently deployed in extremely dangerous and difficult environments. Because of the multiple stress factors in these red zones\textsuperscript{20}, including both physical and psychological fatigue, CLAs are entitled to a time off (TO) of five days after a working period of thirty consecutive days.\textsuperscript{21} During this time CLAs are required to leave the area and return to their designated duty stations for recuperation.\textsuperscript{22} However, irregular and cancelled flights can lead to a CLA being stuck either before departure or upon his/her return while the base’s other CLA has to accommodate this by prolonging their duty or returning from leave early. Emergency situations in their area of responsibility can further delay the departure of CLAs.

In order to prevent burn-out and stress factors that can affect their performance, CLAs are regularly rotated between deployments. During focus group discussions, the ideal deployment time in one location has been estimated between one and two years. Such flexibility is said to strike a balance between (i) being effectively integrated into the new working environment and (ii) becoming biased. For an effective rotation mechanism, it is essential that CLAs alternate between easier and more difficult duty stations and that this is organized in a fair and transparent manner. However, several factors make this difficult to implement.

First, MONUSCO’s efforts to respond adequately to the volatile environment in eastern DRC have led to continuous changes and hampered long term planning. Military bases are, for instance, opened and closed according to existing needs – a process CLAs quickly need to be able to adapt to. Second, protection and peace consolidation activities at the field level often require flexibility as CLAs might, for example, be withdrawn because of on-going military operations. Thirdly, Civil Affairs is often asked to extend the deployment of a CLA who is particularly appreciated by his commander. Once effective and comfortable, CLAs do not necessarily want to rotate. Finally, there are unforeseen individual cases which require special attention. For instance, the North Kivu provincial office in Goma has redeployed a CLA to a nearby base in view of his wife’s serious medical condition. Hence, contractual, organizational and personal circumstances may affect this redeployment principle. Further, the Mission’s Human Resources regulations do not authorize rotations without a proper ‘Movement of Post Justification’. The Section should aim to discuss these challenges with the relevant desks to find appropriate solutions.

In the light of the Mission’s transition from West to Eastern DRC, MONUSCO faces difficulties to proceed with old practices of relocating national staff without a formal redeployment process. The same applies for CLAs and the informal process of rotation. These issues need to be discussed with HR and the Legal Section, and new guidelines should be elaborated in the CLA SOPs and TORs.

Living and working in MONUSCO COB/TOBs requires basic infrastructure, security and the tools necessary to conduct duties (satellite phones, mobile phones, laptop, etc.). However, such harsh environments also results in important challenges for the CLAs. Managerial, administrative and logistical challenges have a negative impact on the motivation and performance of the CLAs. Such challenges include: (i) many commanders prefer to install CLAs in a distinct area of the camp, which can amount to isolation; (ii) allegations have been made that their tents, often not water-proof or wind-resistant, tend to be the least comfortable/functional. For example, some reported being unable to close their tents, depriving CLAs of the most basic privacy requirements; (iii) internet access and

\textsuperscript{20} Red zones are defined in the SOPs as: “Zones designated as extremely dangerous due to the security situation and the consequent impossibility of specific equipment to reach the zone”. Under the lead of UNDSS, MONUSCO security makes the assessments, which has been expressed to sometimes not reflect the reality in the field.

\textsuperscript{21} The new SOP proposes a six-week working period before Time Off.

\textsuperscript{22} MONUSCO Standard Operation Procedures for the administration of Language Assistants and Community Liaison Assistants, June 2012
telephone network coverage are frequently limited, impacting on communications and particularly the delivery of their reports. In light of these challenges, CLAs prefer to equip themselves at their own. Although CLAs are equipped by MSC/CAS/DMS and not by the Military, it has proven valuable that heads of field offices advocate to the military contingents at the local and the provincial/brigade level to ensure that CLAs are fully supported by their respective commanders. Similarly, CAS management has to continue efforts with MONUSCO’s Supply section and GITTS to ensure that CLAs receive the required equipment on time, such as appropriate tents and working computers.

The perceptions and expectations of local populations are shaped by the CLAs’ relationship with the Force. On the one hand, this relationship may enhance the CLAs’ authority and respect vis-à-vis the population. On the other hand, the CLAs’ proximity to the Force can also confine them to an outsider’s role. It is imperative that the CLAs avoid unrealistically raising the expectations of the community regarding the CLAs’ power and influence, as this might lead to disappointment and frustration.

![Photo: A CLA in his living and working environment, credit Myriam Asmani/PID](image)

The degree to which a CLA can integrate into the community depends, amongst other things, on housing arrangements. Should the security conditions permit, CLAs are often free to choose whether they live in the military base or find private housing. Indeed, the latter option paves the way for an effective engagement with the community and a more discrete relationship between CLAs and their information sources. Those CLAs who chose to live in private housing often have a small choice to do so, and most importantly, face more direct security concerns. Practices vary from one province to another: (a) in Bukavu (South Kivu provincial office) 8 out of the 12 COBs decided on the out-of-base lodging option, while (b) in Uvira (same province) all field CLAs live in the military bases.
Although CLAs are supposed to conduct a part of their work independently, they lack own means of transportation or a regular dispatch service. On the ground, they thus depend on their respective commander and military observers (Milobs). This is often impractical as the contingents may have other tasks and priorities that do not match the CLAs work plan. Civil Affairs is fully aware of the Mission’s budgetary constraints but believes that providing alternative means of transport such as bicycles or motorbikes would significantly increase CLAs independence.

3.4 Administration

Field CLAs are managed from seven offices in Kalemie (Katanga), Uvira and Bukavu (South Kivu), Goma and Beni (North Kivu), Bunia and Dungu (Orientale Province). The lack of international staff to manage CLAs prompted the section to implement a system of CLA Focal Points in the provincial offices. The Focal Points have either served as field CLAs or were specifically recruited as GL6 in 2012. However, Focal Points are often overwhelmed by the many substantive and administrative tasks this position entails: administering the movement of up to 20 CLAs, verifying their reports and providing timely feedback, conveying alerts, transmitting and explaining instructions to CLAs, as well as fulfilling a variety of support duties for Civil Affairs international staff.

Focal Points are at times exposed to criticism from their CLA colleagues in the field. During interviews, field CLAs have complained that the Focal Points ignore questions and make unreasonable demands. Many Focal Points have not served in the field, and might lack an understanding of and empathy for field realities. During recruitment of Focal Points, Civil Affairs should thus continue to find the balance between relevant field experiences and analytical and management capacity. Given their crucial role for the effective functioning of the CLA tool, the section should aim at reinforcing Focal Points both in number and authority. They could, for example, be increased through choosing Focal Points with field experience and assigning them an official role in the CLA reporting line. However, the fact that Focal Points themselves need proper guidance and supervision by international staff should not be neglected.

![Distribution of CLAs](image)
CLA Focal Points operate under a clear-cut hierarchic reporting line: (i) the head of Civil Affairs in the provincial office is the CLAs’ first reporting officer, (ii) the MONUSCO head of provincial office becomes the second reporting officer and, (iii) as laid out in the SOP, the COB/TOB Commanders function as additional Reporting Officers. As far as the performance evaluation process is concerned, Civil Affairs follows a mixed quantitative/qualitative formula: on the one hand, CLA performance is assessed on the basis of performance reports that are compiled by the Focal Points and state the number of meetings organized and reports drafted. On the other hand, managers enquire with CLA Focal Points and COB/TOB commanders about the quality of the work provided by the CLA. The downside of this system is the limited interaction that the official reporting officers – the local head of CAS and particularly the head of the field office – get to establish with the CLAs they are requested to evaluate. In order to respond to this challenge, more direct reporting lines have been developed to bolster a higher degree of interaction and facilitate quality assessment of the CLA’s performance. However, Civil Affairs should strive to (i) better define the roles of staff with technical supervisory responsible for the CLAs and (ii) ensure that COB/TOB commanders in their capacity of additional reporting officers are effectively involved in the performance evaluation process.

**Best Practice:**

In order to better assess the quality and impact of the CLAs’ work, CA Bunia office has started to not only record the number of CLA reports produced, but also if they were consequently mentioned in reporting to Kinshasa.
4. CLA Activities

CLAs’ primary strength lies in their ability to establish and develop a direct communication line with local communities, authorities and other relevant actors. In order to build an effective network with the local population, CLAs invest a great deal of their time in trust and relationship-building activities. Although each CLA is free to develop the approach that they judge most appropriate to their operating context, Civil Affairs has established a standardized methodology. CLAs, for instance, establish ‘Community Focal Points’, key partners in the community, whom they contact on a daily basis to build a trusting relationship. CLAs also organize ‘Urafiki’ meetings between local communities, authorities and the Mission to build confidence between these key stakeholders. In return, the CLAs’ close ties to the population enable them to gather information, communicate messages, and implement a variety of MONUSCO activities on the ground. According to the CLA work plans, these activities can be roughly divided into six categories:

1. Information gathering, analysis and reporting;
2. Managing the Community Alert Networks (CANs);
3. Increasing community alertness and responsiveness to threats;
4. Facilitating missions and activities on the ground;
5. Enhancing collaboration and communication between MONUSCO, local communities and authorities;
6. Conducting surveys on the perception of communities with regards to MONUSCO’s role in providing protection to civilians.

4.1. Information gathering, analysis and reporting

During their interaction with communities, CLAs strive to obtain information on recent developments and understand the historical, socio-cultural and political dimensions of complex local dynamics. They obtain relevant information about the context and its stakeholders, conduct protection risk and needs assessments, map actors, and identify medium and long-term trends. This information and analysis is then composed in daily, weekly and flash reports, which are consolidated in the regional offices. On the national (OPS East) level, the daily reports from the regional offices are then consolidated into one daily MONUSCO Civil Affairs report. MONUSCO’s substantive sections heavily rely on this information, often basing their own reports on the inputs provided by the CLAs. As a main source of contextual information, the CLA reports feeds into the Mission’s decision making processes.

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**Best Practice:**
CLA Alerts: The North Kivu office has started writing a summary of CLA alerts that is shared with MONUSCO’s substantive sections every day before 15:00 o’clock. Therefore, relevant sections can respond to information raised as well as incorporate it into their reports, once verified and corroborated from their own sources.

**Best Practice:**
Report sharing: CLA reports are first shared with, checked by their respective military commander before being transmitted up the two hierarchies of Force and CAS field offices. This increases the quality of reports, ensures that they are cross-checked and that the commander is informed of the current community context. It also fosters civil-military coordination and cooperation as it creates a framework of interaction between the CLA and the COB commander.

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23 See CLA Handbook and Toolkit.
24 *Urafiki* is the Swahili word for ‘friendship’. As one type of meetings organized by the CLAs, *Urafiki meetings* refer to specific meetings between the COB/TOB commander, government and traditional authorities, and representatives of civil society.
25 Flash reports are done in response to on-going events and important issues that the hierarchy should immediately be informed about to prepare timely responsive or preventive measures.
Challenges of information gathering, analysis and reporting

Confidence: The sharing of reports between the CLA and the COB commander is a crucial mechanism to integrate the civilian and the military components and ensure their local level cooperation and common contextual understanding. However, it also gives commanders a great deal of influence over what information is reported. Some commanders have been reluctant to let CLAs report on delicate issues, thus forcing CLAs to report critical issues directly to Civil Affairs. In such situations, commanders may feel that the CLA has overstepped, or bypassed the commander’s authority, leading to tensions.

- Military contingents need to be further sensitized on CLAs’ roles and responsibilities.
- CA offices should treat information that they receive directly from CLAs with the necessary care and ensure that CLAs are appropriately supported.

Technical difficulties: In the field, technical problems frequently delay CLA reporting. Faced with unstable internet connections, CLAs often have to use telephone messages to inform CAS staff about possible breaking news. Alternatively, in the event of lack of internet connectivity, some CLAs have individually purchased internet-access equipment while waiting for the Supply section to address this issue.

- Ensuring that CLAs have the technical means for doing their work is an important basis for holding them accountable.

Improving reporting skills: Although of high quality and widely appreciated, there remains room to improve CLA reports.

- Emotional vs. technical wording: CLAs tend to use emotional language that may depict events inaccurately, for example “Three people killed” can become three people ‘slaughtered’ or even a ‘massacre’.
- Overcoming the language barrier: Some commanders complained that the poor level of English of certain CLAs results in reports requiring significant editing. However, in regions where francophone troops are stationed, reports are drafted and circulated in French.
- Analysis vs. event reporting: Concerns have been raised about the CLAs’ ability to discern between relevant and irrelevant information. Additionally, it has been noted that CLAs tend to focus on stating facts to the detriment of providing a thorough assessment of the implications and consequences of the events they report on. However, some sections (e.g. JMAC) have also expressed their appreciation for the ‘rawness’ of the data in CLA reports, as it gives the section the opportunity to draw their own conclusions.

To remedy these issues, the following should be considered:

- Civil Affairs needs to dedicate staff time to reinforce the CLA’s reports and analytical capacity through on the job-training. Specific support could be sought and training tools be designed in coordination with the IMTC on basic English reporting skills to align the CLAs’ field report with the reporting style used at HQ level.
- Due to the current CLA-staff ratio, the section does not have the staff available to base capacity-building solely on direct and individualized feedback. Further staffing to manage this ratio imbalance should be explored.
- The Civil Affairs Officer in the sectors (OIC CA), as well as CLA Focal Points should strive to identify milestones, the way forward and success stories in their daily activities and reporting duties.

Increasing analysis: The analysis of the information contained in the vast number of CLA daily, weekly and special reports from over 70 bases is a challenging task. Although it is important to develop effective ways to increase the CLAs’ analytical capacity, the issue cannot solely be solved at their level. Often, the relevant information is included in the CLA reports but not filtered out and followed-up on. CLA Focal Points are already overloaded, and in some cases do not possess the necessary analytical capacities themselves. Thus, Civil Affairs recruited three additional reporting officers to cover North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale.

26 In the Dungu area reports are written in French because there are only francophone Moroccan troops.
CLA Best Practice Review

MONUSCO’s substantive sections should understand that CLAs and Civil Affairs are not in the position to provide information tailored to their specific demands.

The challenge and possible benefit of analyzing the enormous amount of CLA information should be taken on through technological innovations like ITEM.

MONUSCO should consider analyzing CLA information more systematically, for example through giving JMAC the mandate and capacity.

4.2. Managing the Community Alert Networks (CAN)

The CLAs are managing MONUSCO’s early warning/early response system, the Community Alert Network (CAN), which allow communities in remote areas to transmit protection alerts to MONUSCO and national security forces for their response to imminent threats. Upon an alert, the Force either (a) responds directly with UN investigation patrols and/or Quick Reaction Force, or (b) transmits the alert to national security forces. Recently, 80% of official responses to a CAN alert have been provided by national protection actors. CANs also build community resilience and increase the ability of the population to contact relevant national protection actors. There are currently 53 operational CANs (46 using mobile phones and 7 using HF radio) managed by 118 CLAs in 55 MONUSCO military operating bases reaching over five million inhabitants across more than 700 communities.

The CAN project has evolved from using Closed Users Group (CUG), where members of one CAN could call each other for free but not make any calls outside of the group, to an Open User Group (OUG) approach that anyone with a cell phone can call. Opening the network to all callers has the advantage of involving the community in the protection process and has effectively extended the area covered by the CANs. Working with existing resources of the community has relieved Civil Affairs of the considerable burden of providing and maintaining over 500 telephones. As supposed to well-established Focal Points, callers now remain anonymous and cannot be identified by perpetrators. This reduces both the exposure of Focal Points and others transmitting alarms to MONUSCO.

CLAs submit data on CAN alerts and responses on a weekly basis. Regional CAN focal points then compile their inputs and consolidate monthly CAN reports.

Best Practice: Involvement of National Security Actors: CLAs have worked closely with commanders to successfully solicit responses to CAN alerts from national security actors (PNC, FARDC, and Civil Administration). This has improved the capacity of the DRC law enforcement agents to respond to reported threats, reducing the number of alerts without reaction to only 1%. The approach is also in line with reinforcing the local state authority’s lead in protecting its own population and MONUSCO’s exit strategy.

Best Practice: As CLAs become known amongst all members of the community as the point of contact for transmitting protection threats, they are also exposed to retaliation by armed groups. For instance, during the M23 rebellion CLAs were under threat in Kiwanja and Katale (North Kivu). In order to mitigate these risks, CLAs do not reveal their full identity over the phone and only move as a team or with military escorts in sensitive areas. During joint MONUSCO-FARDC military operations in their zone, CLAs are often restricted to the COB/TOBs.

27 A Quick Reaction Force usually consists of one platoon (30 soldiers) that is on standby and supposed to be able to intervene immediately. According to the Force, limiting factors are only the distance and the availability of vehicles.
29 Code cable CCX 006.
30 Review of the Community Alert Network, Civil Affairs 2013; CAN Report July to December 2013, 2014 – not available online but can be requested through MONUSCO CAS.
Challenges of managing the Community Alert Networks (CAN)

Finding HF partners: CLAs are confronted with serious challenges in those areas not covered by telephone network: the lack of network coverage limits the chances of finding reliable partners to implement high frequency radio CANs.
- The search for appropriate partners for HF CANs should be done on the field level, but also supported on the regional and national levels.
- The military components should be sensitized on the importance of CAN to maximize synergies through ad-hoc arrangements where the Force radio operators work with CLAs to ensure CAN coverage. Ideally, this should increase the sense of ownership of the tool amongst the Force: they should be responsible of the response while the CLAs are responsible for the community, the alert and its proper transmission.

Ensuring visibility: Increasingly involving national security agents in reacting to CAN alert has reduced MONUSCO’s visibility as collecting/conveying alarms and soliciting responses are background tasks. This has not only contributed to ameliorate the Mission’s public perception but also presented the Section with an important opportunity to help the population regain lost confidence. A possible downside of this discrete mechanism could be the lack of appreciation for the CAN system by the communities, as neither CLAs nor the peacekeepers get the credit they would otherwise deserve. Civil Affairs Officers and CLAs need to continue raising awareness among the contingents, especially on follow-up investigation patrols in cases of transferred alerts. The military hierarchy should not only sensitize commanders on the necessity of visible action, but should order commanders to be responsible and accountable for both response and lack of response to alerts received through the CANs.

Going beyond: The majority of CAN alerts is received after the incidents have taken place and perpetrators fled (65% in 2013). The fact that CANs are becoming increasingly reactive is problematic as proactivity is the very essence of the tool. Civil Affairs is thus working on sensitizing the population and encouraging them to provide relevant information beforehand. E.g., local communities are often aware when armed groups are regrouping or trespassing. Another way to improve the usefulness of the CAN tool is to map incidents which can give an indication where the next violations are likely to take place and thus, where patrols and the presence of peacekeepers is needed. In this regard, ITEM could prove a powerful addition to CAN.

The need to verify: The fact that calls are no longer received exclusively from reliable Focal Points helps expanding the scope; however, it also means that CLAs have to spend more time and phone credit on cross-checking received information, which eventually leads to delayed responses. More reliable and precise alert information and verification mechanisms are still provided through the community Focal Points. Thus, the CLAs’ work with the community remains crucial to ensure proper management of CANs.

4.3. Increasing community alertness and responsiveness to threats

39. The CLAs are active in empowering local communities to be more involved in their own protection. For this purpose, CLAs support communities in establishing Community Protection Committees (CPCs). CPCs are forums where the local population, civil society and traditional authorities can discuss protection risks, envisage mitigation measures, and formulate recommendations. 31

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31 CPCs were originally called Local Protection Committees. In 2012 the name was changed but the functions largely remained the same and often the two expressions are used interchangeably.
CLAs have a key role in establishing, maintaining and training Community Protection Committees. With planning for MONUSCO’s exit strategy ongoing, Civil Affairs is considering how this responsibility can be transferred to local communities to ensure that CPCs will function independently. As a basis for a possible transition, an assessment of local stakeholders and NGOs with similar existing mechanisms is currently conducted under the ‘Do No Harm’ principle. This analysis will clarify what mechanisms already exist, how they function and in what ways they interact with local dynamics.

With the input of the CPC, JPTs and others, CLAs develop Community Protection Plans (CPPs). These were originally conceptualized as an instrument for the Force to more effectively protect civilians. They were initially intended to inform commanders and support them in better understanding POC threats. In order to avoid both the Force and the community with the potential of the CPP tool, Civil Affairs adapted and extended the approach to support the community in self-protection, while at the same time keeping the initial military focus. CPPs therefore function as a mechanism for communities to reflect on protection threats and develop mitigation strategies, and support the Force in developing specific POC strategies.

**Challenges concerning CPCs and CPPs**

*Lack of regulation:* CPCs and CPPs do not cohere in all Areas of Responsibility. Currently, a regulated and coherent approach to establish CPCs and CPPs is being developed.

- Once a regulated process is established, CLAs need to be briefed on the new approach, and new CPPs need to be developed with CPCs, and eventually shared with the Force.

*Ownership:* The CLAs’ role in these instruments is too large, which decreases the much-desired community ownership of the instrument.

- Both instruments need to be more community-based and participative in order to be effective and sustainable.
- CLAs should develop partnerships with local NGOs and other authorities, as well as include the Force into the process more tightly.

### 4.4. Facilitating missions and activities on the ground

The CLAs’ knowledge of the local context and good connection to the population make them ideal facilitators for field visits and allows them to implement a wide variety of activities on the ground. As outlined above, CLAs play a crucial role supporting JPT and JAM missions, from the preparatory phase prior to their arrival to the following-up of recommendations. This allows the missions to concentrate on the analysis and in return, JPTs provide CLAs with input and support. Thus, the synergies struck between JPTs/JAMs and CLAs present a positive example.

Similarly, CLAs facilitate the protection work of other substantive sections, such as Human Rights, Child Protection or Sexual Violence. These sections generally have no staff in the field and thus require support to identify their targets, conduct their activities and follow-up on cases. CLAs will, e.g., transmit the information that an armed group recruited child soldiers to Child Protection and ensure that these children are properly demobilized.

CLAs are responsible for civil-military coordination and information exchange at the local level. Through their daily interaction with the base commander, CLAs ensure that civilian and the military components of the Mission have a common perspective. For that purpose, Civil Affairs specifically designed mechanisms, such as the Joint Weekly Planning or the verification of the CLA reports by their respective commanders.

Before, during and after military operations, CLAs have to ensure that the civilian perspective is considered. They inform the base commanders and national security agents, such as FARDC, PNC and ANR, about the realities of
local populations, sensitize them on Human Rights aspects and International Humanitarian Law principles. Lastly, CLAs have an active advocacy role campaign for the cessation of threatening behavior and practices.

**Best Practice:** The weekly planning between local commander and their CLAs is an important mechanism for ensuring that civilian and military priorities are exchanged and considered. It is an opportunity to convince commanders to take desired actions, for example in regards to alternating patrolling routes. Joint planning can furthermore ensure that CLA are able to conduct their activities, as they largely depend on the commanders in regards to security, logistics and transport.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges of facilitating missions and activities on the ground</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prioritization:</strong> CLA work plans are becoming increasingly wide-ranging and complex. New tasks have been added over the last four years. According to their revised TORs, CLAs will soon take on additional tasks in the stabilization of areas freed from armed groups. In addition, it is worth noting that different substantive sections also request the support of CLAs, thus increasing their workload. Overall, Civil Affairs noted that CLAs in the field struggle to prioritize their tasks and sometimes to perform them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ A clear and concise redrafting of TORs for CLAs combined with proper debriefings on new tasks can shade some light on this issue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ An open dialogue led by Civil Affairs with (i) the Mission’s substantive section requesting CLAs’ support, (ii) the Force and (iii) CLA representatives appears to be a prerequisite to redrafting their TORs. This feasibility assessment would help the Section and the Mission understanding not only the added value of the tool but also its limitations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ A 3-months priority planning should be done with each CLA on an individual basis.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ensure joint-planning:</strong> In many places, the weekly planning between commander and CLA is not taking place.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Ideally, joint planning should be based on a Joint Action Plan at the local level. This tool would allow the CLAs to plan accordingly, properly report on the progress achieved and frame the regular reporting tasks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ The importance of joint planning should be stressed during COB/TOB visits as well as enhance its visibility within the Mission. Civil Affairs needs to work through the military hierarchy on the national and the provincial level to ensure that the best practice of joint planning is recognized and respected.</td>
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4.5. Dealing with spoilers and enhancing MONUSCO’s perception vis-à-vis local communities and authorities

In addition to providing MONUSCO with information about the needs of the communities they serve, CLAs are in the ideal position to sensitize on MONUSCO’s mandate and capacities through outreach activities at the grass-roots level. Informed communities have shown to be more appreciative of MONUSCO’s presence and are less likely to become hostile towards the Mission. In order to ensure dissemination and comprehension of relevant information, outreach messages should not only be simple and clear, but developed in participative processes by the CLAs themselves.

Tackling the population’s misperceptions and rumors is a big challenge for the Mission and the CLAs. The perception problem appears to be rooted in both the unrealistic expectations of the population and deliberate manipulation. The majority of the population is unaware of MONUSCO’s mandate and the Mission’s capacities and limitations, which predisposes them to develop unrealistic expectations. At the same time, the Mission’s actual accomplishments often remain unknown. These two factors create an easy predisposition for members of national security agencies, local government and civil society organizations as well as community leaders to engage in

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32 See: Protection Data from Eastern DRC, Baseline Survey Selected Preliminary Results, Internal, 2014
deliberate manipulation of the population. If, for example, MONUSCO is perceived to support armed groups, the Congolese police and army can hardly be made responsible for their underachievement.

**Challenges of dealing with spoilers and enhancing MONUSCO's perception**

**Holistic approach:** The dimension of outreach problems has been underestimated by the Mission and, as a consequence, CLAs are left to implement an outreach strategy that they are neither particularly well qualified nor equipped for. CLAs are close to the community, but outreach is only one of their many tasks. Many CLAs stated that they do not have the technical equipment, such as projectors or hand-out materials, to engage in effective sensitization activities.

**Need for an overarching communication strategy:** Although Civil Affairs has achieved a lot in the past, the findings of the above-mentioned perception polling suggest that much remains to be done. MONUSCO’s leadership recognizes the challenges the Mission faces in regard to its perception by the population, and needs to implement a systematic and integrated communication strategy tackling all relevant actors, decision makers and opinion-shapers.

**Ownership:** At times, the sensitization activities have been lacking enthusiasm and effectiveness. When talking about MONUSCO’s mandate, CLAs tend to repeat headlines without really understanding their relevance.

- CLAs should take a lead role in developing simple, relevant and effective communication messages which they subsequently disseminate to local communities.

### 4.6. Conducting surveys on the perception of communities with regards to MONUSCO’s role in providing protection to civilians

The CLAs embody a two-way, communicative link between MONUSCO and communities. The close contact between CLAs and the population is also intended to give the latter a platform to express their priorities, concerns and needs. Outreach activities in particular have served as an opportunity for local communities to do so. Most recently, CLAs have become involved in gathering the perception of local communities on their security through regular surveys. These surveys have been developed and are conducted in a partnership between MONUSCO’s Civil Affairs section, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

After an initial baseline study conducted in December 2013, quarterly surveys will be directed among approximately 4,500 adults over the period of three years. The surveys aim to detect changes in the area of human security, protection, governance and justice in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri Provinces. It will also assess the population’s level of confidence in justice and protection institutions and provide an in-depth analysis of the changing perceptions of key actors of stabilization and peace consolidation activities. With the help of specifically trained CLAs, participants are asked about the main drivers of insecurity, the providers of security and what should be done to improve security.

The survey results will strengthen the activities of MONUSCO, UNDP, UNCT and others in the area of human security, rule of law and access to justice. Identifying the needs and priorities of the population will be the basis for improved analysis and strategic planning. The survey will also allow holding actors accountable and benchmarking progress.

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33 UNDP concept note, May 2013.
5. Contribution and Impact

CLAs have been recognized as a major innovation that contributes considerably to the success of the implementation of the Mission’s POC mandate. Numerous interviews with the Mission and its interlocutors have confirmed that CLAs are appreciated by the population and seen as indispensable across MONUSCO’s civil and military components and hierarchy. No one has voiced criticism against the instrument per se, and the fact that CLAs are highly sought after by other sections demonstrates their crucial function within the Mission.

The impact of many CLA activities, such as advocacy, is difficult to measure. It is not clear what course events would have taken without CLA intervention. However, investigating best practices, this review is more interested in ‘how’ and ‘why’ CLAs contribute to the Mission’s work. Qualitative analysis therefore appears to be more appropriate to achieve a better understanding of CLAs’ impact as well as the process of achieving it.

Given these challenges, this review focuses on demonstrating the contribution of CLAs while also acknowledging that other factors and actors contribute to these positive outcomes. Contribution analysis thus aims to illustrate change and provide evidence on the difference CLAs are making to observed outcomes, rather than measuring impact per se. It is typically done through case studies and significant change stories, which are systematically selected in interviews and focus group discussions.

The first step is to clarify what kind of change is expected. The CLA’s TORs and work plan give a basis for performance appraisal, but in what ways CLA outputs result in impact is less clear. It is thus useful to review what is expected from CLAs in terms of outputs and how these are assumed to result in impact. In this document, this is done along six categories in which the CLA tasks can be divided according to the CLA work plans:

5.1. Result chains

1) Information collection, analysis and reporting: a variety of reports, should lead to more targeted and appropriate interventions.

**Activity:**
Information collection and analysis e.g. through 20 daily, 4 weekly and timely special reports; Up to date CPPs

**Outcome:**
MONUSCO’s different sections are timely informed about current trends and realities on the ground.

**Assumed impact:**
Information is used to improve strategic and tactical planning, decision-making and action, resulting in better interventions.

2) Managing early warning system/CANs: should lead to the Mission being informed about protection risks and responses and thus increase its capacity to react and to prevent incidents. On the long run, this should result in a reduction of protection threats to the population.

**Activity:**
Establishing CAN focal points; Registering CAN alerts; request responses

**Outcome:**
Security actors can react to and prevent security incidents with direct impact on civilian populations.

**Assumed impact:**
A more responsive and secure environment in MONUSCO’s zone of intervention.
3) **Increasing community alertness and responsiveness to threats:** through Community Protection Committees (CPCs) and Community Protection Plans (CPPs) aims at increasing the communities’ alertness, preparation and responsiveness.

- Reinforce communities’ capacity through assisting CPCs in developing CPPs and training 15 actors in each locality on early warning and community resilience.

4) **Facilitating missions and activities on the ground:** should increase the number and quality of Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) and Joint Assessment Mission (JAMs) as well as the number of follow-up cases.

- Facilitate MONUSCO’s protection work in the field e.g. through supporting JPTs.

5) **Dealing with spoilers and enhancing MONUSCO’s perception vis-à-vis local communities and authorities:** should facilitate the implementation of the protection mandate and the cooperation with local communities.

- Building trust and enhancing collaboration through organizing Urafiki meetings, outreach activities, etc.

6) **Conducting surveys on the perception of communities with regards to MONUSCO’s role in providing protection to civilians:** should improve knowledge about communities’ perceptions on their own security, which in return should improve MONUSCO’s interventions.

- Perception surveys of local communities in the East, conducted every three months.

- Better understanding of protection needs and priorities of local communities.

- The population’s protection needs and priorities are more considered in MONUSCO’s planning and implementation of POC activities.
In order to assess the different contributions that CLAs are making, the underlying theory of change should be analyzed on each level of the result chain. Success stories serve to explain why it is reasonable to assume that the actions of the CLAs have contributed to the observed outcomes. The methodology applied aims at collecting so-called ‘significant change stories’, and systematically selecting the ones considered to have had the most significant impact on people’s lives. This methodology illustrates change instead of measuring impact and has the advantage, that communities and CLAs are integrated in the process. In the following, some selected CLA success stories are presented.

5.2 Success Stories

Success Story 1: Quick Reaction Force saves lives in Kashebere (North Kivu)
On 03 February 2014, a JPT was sent to Kashebere to assess the closure of the TOB. In the afternoon, the team suddenly heard gunshots on the West side of the TOB and found itself in the middle of an acute protection situation. Through the established contacts of the CLA, they quickly learned that FARDC had started an unexpected attack against the APCLS, an armed group they had previously cohabited with in the area. In consultation with the CLA, the TOB commander decided to send out a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of about thirty men in armed vehicles. This calmed the situation immediately and the population stopped fleeing the area. Luckily, no one was hurt, but the CLA soon received a call that some civilians were stranded across the frontline 4 km west of the TOB (in APCLS zone). He transmitted this alert to the commander and the civilians were rescued and brought back to Kashebere in an armed vehicle. The joint CLA-TOB action calmed the situation down and civilians returned to their homes the following week. The JPT concluded that it was too early to close the TOB as it was still needed for protecting civilians in the area.

Success Story 2: CLAs advocate ending harassment of the population in Kiliwa (Province Orientale)
The FARDC platoon deployed in Kiliwa (45 km north of Dungu) to counter threats from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) quickly started harassing the population. The abuses included looting of food from civilians, cases of sexual violence, torture, forced labor to build soldiers’ houses, systematic poaching by the commander, etc. The chef de groupement was accused of supporting soldiers in some of these violations and abuses. CLAs from Dungu and Duru jointly took action and encouraged the Force to intensify patrols to counter threats from the Lord’s Resistance Army. They subsequently recommended to the MONUSCO Head of Office (HoO) to advocate for the arrest of the perpetrators and replace the local FARDC commander. This process took about two months until the platoon commander in question was replaced by a new lieutenant from Faradje and the military court started an investigation on two cases of sexual violence. Although that perpetrator had fled and victims never received compensation, the unit contributed to an effective halt to this trend paved the way for the harmony between the community and the new platoon commander. Community leaders thanked MONUSCO for the support, which tremendously increased confidence in the mission.

Success Story 3: CLA established CPC in Otobora (North Kivu)
In Otobora, CLAs established a CPC comprised of customary and civil society leaders. Besides dealing with issues such as arbitrary arrests and illegal tax collection, the CPC functions as an interface between MONUSCO and the armed groups (Mai-Mai Kifuaia and Raia Mutomboki). CPC members engage with leaders of armed groups and if those fail to cooperate they call on groupement authorities to increase the pressure on them. Through this strategy, CLAs achieved the withdrawal of armed groups from Otobora and an establishment of a ‘buffer zone’ without their presence from Hombo to Musenge. This considerably improved the protection situation in the area and allowed for the reopening of schools and health centers as well and encouraged the communities to resume their farming activities. As a result, an estimated 4,000 families returned to their hometown.
CLA Best Practice Review

August 1, 2014

Success Story 4: Minova (South Kivu) CLAs initiated a night patrol to prevent looting by FARDC Special Battalion

On 24 December 2013, CLAs based in the COB Minova received an alert at 01:21 am that the FARDC Special Battalion deployed in the area was planning to loot the shops in the center of Minova. This practice is not unheard of in the event of delayed payment of wages, as in this case, of approximately 4 months. As the locals were still suffering from the lootings by FARDC troops during the clashes with M23 in November 2012, they immediately called the CLAs they had regular contacts with. CLAs conveyed the alert to the COB commander, suggesting a joint patrol to the center towards the market shops and a security meeting with community leaders the next morning to prevent the escalation of the incident. CLAs participated in the night patrol and sensitized the FARDC on the negative impact of looting during the security meeting. Consequently, the looting was prevented and the civilian population felt safer and perceived MONUSCO’s action as a relief. CLAs reported that the population feedback to the commander and recommended that patrols should be continued until the New Year celebration. The CLAs convinced the COB commander by demonstrating the great appreciation of the locals, indicating that the population would become more cooperative and provide timely alerts for further protection successes. The commander agreed and night patrols were extended for another week. In addition, the CLAs’ and COB commanders’ action drew attention to the salary issue and thus accelerated the payment of salaries to the FARDC Special Battalion. As a result, the festive days, which are often the most violent of the year, passed peacefully and without any looting.

Success Story 5: CLAs support Civil Society in Tongo (North Kivu)

In Tongo, there was no organized civil society. In a very confusing situation, two individuals were claiming to be the representatives of Civil Society, one recognized by the local authorities and one claiming to have been elected by the population. This division between the two spilled over to all Civil Society actors, effectively splitting them into two opposing camps. After an initial analysis of the situation, CLAs met with the two individuals and convinced them of the necessity to organize an open and transparent election. A civil society Committee was established as a result and the CLAs are currently engaged in reinforcing the capacities of this new committee.

Success Story 6: CLAs help to avoid bloodshed in Goma (North Kivu)

In 2011, opposition parties in Goma were preparing demonstrations to contest the Presidential and Parliamentary elections results. CLAs received an alert that armed CNDP militias were printing T-shirts with UDPS (Union des Démocrates pour le Progrès Social) labels and were going to infiltrate the demonstrators. The main concern was the probability of shooting and killings that could later be attributed to the UDPS opposition. At this point, CLAs in the area assessed the short-term risks for the demonstrators as well as the medium-term threats of a potentially violent political climate in the region. The CLAs shared their concerns with the COB commander and the Civil Affairs section. Detailed information was gathered and passed on to the provincial authorities (Mayor and PNC Officer). In response, a search was conducted in some residences and the printed T-shirts were found in the home of a former CNDP officer. The violence was avoided and the demonstration took place without major disturbances.

Success Story 7: CLAs reduce anti-MONUSCO sentiments in Kitchanga (North Kivu)

In September 2013, anti-MONUSCO sentiments were on the rise in the Pinga-Kitchanga axis, when rumors were spread that the Uruguayan battalion is buying minerals from the notorious Mai-Mai warlord Cheka and supporting his armed group with arms and ammunition. Questioning the neutrality of the UN, local authorities subsequently stopped sharing information with CLAs. In addition to this, the population started blocking roads and barring the access of MONUSCO vehicles to their villages. The CLAs immediately developed a series of meetings with the traditional leaders and explained MONUSCO’s mandate, activities and principles to village chiefs and influential community members. They stressed the need for MONUSCO personnel to access any location requiring their presence to protect civilians, and their active engagement to counter manipulation and unfounded rumors against

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34 The problem of delayed and unpaid salaried has been identified as the main reasons for ill-disciplined national security forces. Recently there has been improvement on this as police and military have been biometrically assessed and salaries are supposed paid to individuals directly instead of going through commanders.
MONUSCO. In a parallel move, FARDC, PNC and ANR officials appealed to the population to refrain from taking action against MONUSCO. Over the period of two months the CLAs action resulted in a reduction of negative sentiments against MONUSCO, the re-establishment of trust between MONUSCO and improved information sharing.

**Success Story 8: CLAs gather real-time intelligence on ADF/NALU attack on Kamango**

In the morning of 25 December 2013, ADF/NALU combatants launched an attack on the locality of Kamango (80 km north-east of Beni town). CLAs from Boikene and Mutwaga alerted the Force and the CA HoO and provided accurate and reliable real-time information on what was happening on the ground. The information included the location, estimated numbers, actions/activities and movements of ADF combatants, FARDC regiments, and the local populations. Following the alert, the North Kivu Brigade Commander arrived in Beni and immediately set up an emergency management unit. The information provided by the CLAs formed the most essential inputs in the Commander’s briefings, analyses and decisions, because it was more accurate and more relevant than the information received from FARDC sources. The accuracy of the information provided by CLA sources contributed significantly to the success of the following military intervention.

### 5.3 The case of absent CLAs in Beni

On 16 January 2014, the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) started military operation ‘Sokola 1’\(^ {35} \) against ADF/NALU positions in Beni and Lubero territories (North Kivu province). The following day, all non-critical international staff in MONUSCO’s Beni sub-office was relocated to Goma as the ADF had threatened retaliation against MONUSCO for its cooperation with the FARDC. Following the fatal shooting on 4 February 2014 of a national staff from the DDR office in Beni, the evacuation order was extended to the Mission’s national staff, including the 18 CLAs who had been embedded in MONUSCO’s military bases. Explicitly instructing CLAs to even suspend any ‘informal work’ in the territories of Beni and Lubero, this decision had a considerable impact on the protection work of the Mission.

As CLAs form the link between the local communities and peacekeepers, severing this link meant that peacekeepers reduced their interaction with the population to a minimum, resulting in several constraints:

- Patrols have reportedly not taken place during the CLAs’ absence. Language Assistants (who remained in Beni) were not able to interact with local authorities and the communities on the same level as CLAs. Both the population and the commanders immediately felt the difference, as Language Assistants can translate but are not professionally equipped to conduct analysis and suggest solutions to specific POC issues.
- The frequency of received phone calls from CAN Focal Points decreased. Most of the Focal Points quickly became aware that the CLAs had been evacuated and therefore saw no benefit in forwarding protection alerts.
- Communities and Focal Points were upset and disappointed by the withdrawal of CLAs during such a critical and volatile period.
- The absence of CLAs during military operations led to uncertainty and perceived insecurity, as local communities lacked their interlocutor to MONUSCO, informing them about ongoing operations.
- No Urafiki or security meetings were organized in the absence of CLAs. Similarly, the implementation of Community Protection Plans was reduced, as no one organized bi-weekly CPC reunions.
- The number of reports as well as their quality was considerably reduced as CLAs were unable to verify information. MONUSCO’s substantial sections, such as Political Affairs, Child Protection, Human Rights and DDRRR were unable to get the usual POC-related information from repots or liaise with CLAs in the field to get more details on respective cases.

\(^ {35} \) The name of the operation stems from the Congolese Swahili term Kusokola, which means ‘to clean’. Sokola 2 is the name of the subsequent operations against the FDLR in Tongo.
The halt of all CLA activities and the lack of engagement of peacekeepers with the population led to an additional deterioration of security in almost all of the COB/TOBs. The absence of CLAs was particularly felt because they could have made such an important contribution to the ongoing military operations against ADF/NALU, as well as to the mitigation of the resulting protection risks. More specifically:

- In the absence of its civilian ‘eyes and ears’ the Mission was unable to independently monitor human rights violations against civilian populations, including those committed by FARDC elements. At the same time, the FARDC have hardly shared any information with the Mission.
- Without the CLAs, MONUSCO was unable to assess the displacement of population as well as the protection threat posed to them.
- Without CLAs it became very difficult to correctly assess the security threats posed by ADF/NALU elements. Thus, the Mission was forced to rely on the – oftentimes biased – assessments of FARDC/PNC and local authorities.

In light of the above, the return of the evacuated MONUSCO staff members to their duty stations in COBs Butembo and Lubero in March 2014 had a very positive impact. Returning CLAs managed to restore trust and confidence that had been damaged by their departure and the volatile context of military operations. Patrols to protect local communities have recommenced and CLAs resumed their usual activities.

### 5.4 CLA alternatives

CLA salaries are in line with UN standards. In comparison to national employers and other international organizations active in DRC, CLAs are very well compensated, especially for field staff. Given their high numbers (202), CLA salaries amount to a considerable sum in a time of reducing budgets for the Mission. In the following, different alternatives are considered.

CLAs are a unique staff category with a rare combination of skills. They were specifically recruited but have also developed their capacities over the past 4 years. As Congolese nationals, versatile in communication techniques and speaking local languages, they are particularly apt to build links with local communities and authorities. They have field experience and a proven record to work in difficult situations. CLA field capacities are complemented by analytical and report writing skills.

Because of this rare combination of qualifications and skills, it is questionable whether other staff categories would be able to take on CLA tasks. If such a large number of staff was to be recruited according to UN regulations, the process would be quite costly. In addition, building up comparable skills and expertise levels in new staff would also be resource intensive in regards to trainings and staff time.

Since international staff is an unlikely alternative to CLAs, MONUSCO an alternative would be to recruit National UNVs. As national UNV salaries are substantially lower than CLA salaries, this alternative would be a less cost-intensive solution. However, the CLAs’ considerable compensation also ensured that MONUSCO was able to recruit the best among the available nationals. It is unlikely that national UNV salaries would attract the same quality of personnel. National UNVs replacing CLAs would most likely result in a noticeable reduction in the quality of work.

CLAs could potentially be replaced by a very different arrangement with Civil Society organizations. Instead of directly employing staff, Civil Affairs could outsource the tool and cooperate with Civil Society organizations or NGOs that provide similar services. However, a ‘contractor’ model seems to be an inappropriate solution for the sensitive context of Eastern DRC, as MONUSCO needs to rely on neutral and dedicated staff.
6. **New Opportunities: MONUSCO reconfiguration and CLAs**

MONUSCO is in the midst of a reconfiguration with a variety of important changes already underway. Specifically, MONUSCO’s new protection paradigm shifts from ‘deterrence through presence’ to directly attacking and ‘neutralizing’ the armed groups.\(^{36}\) MONUSCO’s offices in western Congo have been reduced to Antenna offices, while the Operations East Headquarter has been established in Goma. In order to make the Mission more operational, the majority of MONUSCO staff has been moved to the East. In those areas that have been liberated from armed groups, the Islands of Stability (IoS) framework\(^ {37}\) foresees that the Mission moves from protection to stabilization activities. All these changes are taking place in the context of an imminent review and down-sizing of the Mission, in order to support the new mandate and the “need for a clear exit strategy”.\(^ {38}\)

In this dynamic and demanding time, CLAs have a great potential to fulfill a variety of tasks and respond effectively to the Mission’s evolving needs and challenges. The Mission being at a turning point, the use of this great resource is more than ever needed. CLAs are a cost-effective and highly flexible resource and have already begun to take on new responsibilities, such as making assessments for the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU)\(^ {39}\). However, CLAs are still largely seen as a protection instrument because of the context in which they are deployed. In future functions of CLAs, three defining characteristics should be considered: (i) presence on the ground, (ii) proximity to the population and (iii) a clear focus on the population’s and national authorities’ needs. If these characteristics are to be maintained, several options for the use of CLAs in the immediate future emerge:

**Option A: CA pillars within the Island of Stabilities model:** As the Mission transitions towards stabilization in the east, the CLAs could ensure the link between POC and the mid-term stabilization process through a package of immediate activities as outlined in their revised TORs. Remaining based in military bases, CLAs could contribute to the timely implementation of the IoS concept with a larger role in supporting civil society, dialogue, needs assessments and planning of priorities. By doing so, CLAs would substantially contribute to the local implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework\(^ {40}\), the Restoration of State Authority (RSA) and conflict mediation. CLAs could take on a key-role in providing input and sequencing stabilization plans, organizing evaluations, presenting CPPs, facilitating and enabling democratic dialogue.

**Option B: Progressive detachment of CLA from Force to enhance pure CA-portfolio:** As the force progressively frees areas from armed groups and withdraws, CLAs increasingly become ‘agents du terrain’, implementing regular Civil Affairs’ activities. They could be used for community and confidence building tasks, building the foundations for other Mission components. In future, CLAs might progressively be separated from the Force and move closer to UNPOL and territorial administration. In light of MONUSCO’s exit strategy, this could be achieved through slowly transforming CLAs into National UN Volunteers.

**Option C: CLAs as the Missions’ spin-doctors in the field:** With growing awareness about the challenges that MONUSCO faces in regards to negative perceptions and rumors, CLAs’ outreach role could be extended. Code cable CCX-096 on local perceptions states that improvements in this regard require “a holistic and multi-dimensional approach”.\(^ {41}\) This is likely to entail a more comprehensive communication strategy that systematically supports the already on-going efforts of CLAs at the grass-roots level, including strategies to record and mitigate rumors.

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\(^{36}\) Interoffice Memorandum 25 July 2013  
\(^{37}\) Islands of Stability is the name of a strategy paper which outlines how MONUSCO plans to stabilize areas freed from armed groups through a multi-dimensional, multi-stakeholder response.  
\(^{38}\) UNSCR 2147, p.6  
\(^{39}\) This is the unit that coordinates MONUSCO’s stabilization activities.  
\(^{40}\) The PSCF for the DRC and the region is an agreement between 11 states to support the peace process in DRC.  
\(^{41}\) CCX-096, p.4
As an instrument, CLAs can only be as successful as their application and underlying strategic framework. This implies that CLAs have to be empowered through tailored training for their new roles. CLAs should be at the very center of the Mission reconfiguration, and reviewing their SOPs and TORs should be an integral and collaborative process to shape the role of future CLAs.
7. Recommendations

**Mission leadership/strategic planning**

- **CLA as a living mechanism in a living Mission**: CLAs are an instrument that needs to be empowered by an underlying strategic framework and nurtured by clear guidance and targeted training to be effective.

- **Boosting CLA management**: Most of the recommendations of this report require management time and resources to be properly implemented. It is paramount to increase the number of international staff working on the administrative and operational management of CLAs.

- **Exporting best practices**: Overall, CLAs are one of the success stories of MONUSCO’s Civil Affairs section. MONUSCO should make its expertise available to other DPKO Missions and further disseminate the CLA model based on context and dynamics specificities.

**Civil Affairs Section**

- **Empowering CLAs by reinforcing the reporting lines**: Reinforcing management structures, in particular CLA Focal Points, and developing more practical reporting lines are pressing needs to address. Improve the ratio between Focal Points and the CLAs, and choose Focal Points with prior CLA field. Specifically assigned international UNVs could be used to support to the Focal Points.

- **Comprehensive recruitment, deployment and redeployment rules**: Continue mechanisms to mitigate the risk of possible biases in the field. It is important that CAS managers become more aware of ethnic background of CLAs and their Focal Points as well as the role it can play for effective deployment. Clear rules for rotation of CLAs have to be established.

- **Individual CLA Quarterly Priority Plans**: Clarify CLA tasks through more detailed guidance and practical relevance. Consider quarterly priority lists for each individual CLA that identify goals.

- **Bridging the gender gap**: Continue to increase the number of female CLAs through targeted recruitment is a priority for the Section. The possibility of developing specific opening for female CLAs should be discussed with Human Resources, and female-friendly working conditions have to be made available in the field.

- **Transport and supply equipment issues to be provided**: Continue to engage closely with CITS and supply to ensure that CLAs receive appropriate equipment to fulfill their functions. Consider providing CLAs with alternative forms of transport to enhance their mobility (e.g. bicycles, motorbikes).

- **Clarifying the role of CLAs under the CPP structure**: According to the new vision, local communities need to progressively assume higher levels of ownership. CLAs should start to (i) identify the driving forces and the weaknesses of each CPP they take part in; (ii) progressively hand-over responsibilities to the communities and (iii) eventually, hand-over external supervision of fully community-owned and managed CPPs. Based on the preliminary findings, the section will decide on a case-by-case basis whether the process can be initiated.

**Outreach**

- **Training and increased ownership of outreach**: Training on outreach activities should be conducted, and simple and relevant communication messages should be developed in close cooperation with the CLAs. This would increase their ownership and ensure dissemination and comprehension of content.
• **Lessen spoilers and anticipate public perception through a communication strategy:** MONUSCO should recognize the challenges it faces from spoilers and misperception by the community and implement a systematic and integrated communication strategy.

**MONUSCO Force**

• **Enhancing awareness about CLA function and TORs:** Peacekeeping contingents need to be briefed more extensively on the TORs and limitations of CLAs.

• **Increasing ownership of the CLA tool by the Force through joint planning:** in the upcoming SOP and TOR revision process, the Force should be consulted as an interlocutor. Whenever possible COB commanders should include CLAs in joint planning activities, and vice-versa.

• **Stressing the role of CLAs as the link between the Force and communities:** It appears that the CLAs are the only link that the force has with the community. The Force needs to be more approachable and also develop their own links and relationships, accompanied by the CLAs.

**Training**

• **Extend and target training sessions for CLAs:** Extend the length of basic training upon recruitment to at least one week according to a needs assessment. Additionally, train CLAs on working with the community according to specific tasks they are supposed to achieve, and develop new training modules on the implementation of stabilization and RSA activities.

• **Innovative and relevant training resources:** handbooks, presentations and games should continue to be developed on the national level, according to the field’s needs.

• **Further improve reporting, particularly in regards to analysis:** It was widely agreed that capacity building had to be done through training ‘on the job’. That means through the provision of feedback, comments and suggestions in response to reports and conducted activities and interaction as witnessed during field visits. Additionally, reporting/basic analytical skills training could be beneficial.

• **Debriefing sessions as a constant and transparent exercise:** Debriefing session need to be held regularly and according to a transparent schedule. They should be designed according to the CLAs’ needs. These might need to be assessed more systematically beforehand. Inviting internal and external partners to provide inputs has been widely viewed as making debriefings more interesting and diverse.
8. ANNEX

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo with CLA deployment
- List of CLA locations and number deployed

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<th>Office</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>How many CLAs</th>
<th>Number of women</th>
<th>CAN Phone functioning</th>
<th>CAN HF Functioning</th>
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**Total** | **7** | **63 bases** | **202 CLAs** |

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<tr>
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<td>1) 149 in field</td>
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| DRC          | office + HQ Ops East | = 74 %  
2) 11 under recruitment = 5%  
3) 33 in offices = 16%  
4) 5 Gender CLAs = 3%  
5) 4 HIV CLAs = 2% | Women = 10%  
functioning CAN teleph ones | Functio ning CAN HF |